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INFORMATION MARKETS AS GAMES OF CHANCE 
RYAN P. MCCARTHY†
INTRODUCTION 
Humans set up vast machinery to control uncertainty.  In pursuit 
of firm answers, we assemble smart deliberators and take their “ver-
dict” as correct; we consult experts; we poll our peers.1  But recent ex-
periments suggest that one metric—the price signal—can produce 
startlingly accurate predictions of uncertain events.2
In an information market, people trade shares in uncertain out-
comes.3  A now-infamous experiment demonstrates how information 
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1 See Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments:  Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Informa-
tion Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 963 (2005) (explaining that statistical methods, de-
liberation accompanied by a reasoned exchange of ideas and opinions, and informa-
tion markets all elicit information held by the members of groups). 
2 Id. at 1023-34 (discussing the advantages of the price signal and providing ex-
amples of its success). 
3 Information markets have inspired a great deal of academic work in the recent 
past.  See generally INFORMATION MARKETS:  A NEW WAY OF MAKING DECISIONS (Robert 
W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock eds., 2006) [hereinafter INFORMATION MARKETS] (address-
ing a number of theoretical and practical questions on information markets); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA:  HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE (2006) (exploring 
different methods for accessing many minds, with a special focus on information mar-
kets); Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Pre-
dictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2004) (suggesting that information 
markets could help objectively assess government policy); Michael Abramowicz, Predic-
tive Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REV. 69, 82 (2006) (“Because information markets need 
not have any legal consequences, they complete the separation of a prediction mecha-
nism from the decision about what the government should do with the prediction.”); 
Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Using Information Markets To Improve Public Decision 
Making, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213 (2005) (presenting information markets as a 
new framework for containing uncertainty and arguing that information from the 
prices in these markets is likely to be much more accurate than other forecasts); Saul 
Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation:  Lessons from the Iowa Electronic 
Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L. 589 (2003) (exploring how the 
lessons from simple markets, such as information markets, can aid in understanding 
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markets can work in a practical setting.  In 2001, the U.S. Department 
of Defense and other federal agencies launched a pilot project called 
the Policy Analysis Market in order to predict trends in global politics 
that could affect U.S. interests.4  Prices of shares in the market would 
indicate whether participants thought certain events were probable or 
improbable.  For example, one “future” was the military preparedness 
of other nations.5  Put simply, a high price would predict a high level 
of preparedness.  The government scuttled the market after a political 
backlash in 2003, but the example illustrates how information markets 
can serve as an “important supplement to deliberative processes.”6
There are good reasons to believe that groups can come up with 
better answers than individual experts.7  But when groups, such as 
teams of government officials, assemble to solve problems, they com-
monly fall into “groupthink.”8  Members may, for example, errone-
ously defer en masse to an apparently knowledgeable individual, or 
they may decline to air unorthodox views for fear of extrinsic social 
consequences.9  These flaws can produce unwise decisions. 
An information market, like a deliberative group, “aggregate[s] 
information . . . about future events.”10  But what distinguishes the in-
formation market is the availability of the price signal.11  When a fu-
ture uncertain event is identified, players bid on chances based on 
and regulating more complex markets); Sunstein, supra note 1 (discussing the remark-
able successes of information markets and arguing that they are worth sustained atten-
tion); Matthew Einbinder, Note, Information Markets:  Using Market Predictions to Make 
Administrative Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 149 (2006) (proposing that decision makers in 
an administrative context should use information markets to inform their decisions 
because of the empirical evidence of their predictive accuracy); Robin Hanson, Shall 
We Vote on Values, but Bet on Beliefs? (Sept. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), avail-
able at http://hanson.gmu.edu/futarchy.pdf (proposing that we can change our gov-
ernment institutions to rely more on speculative markets because such markets induce 
people to acquire and share knowledge). 
4 See Robin D. Hanson, Designing Real Terrorism Futures, 128 PUB. CHOICE 257, 259-
61 (2006) (detailing the purpose and design of the Policy Analysis Market). 
5 Id. at 259. 
6 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1028-29. 
7 See id. at 971-72 (providing examples of studies that show that the average answer 
of groups of sufficiently large sizes is usually very accurate).  For a popular account, see 
generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, at xiii (2004) (exploring how 
“under the right circumstances, groups are remarkably intelligent and are often 
smarter than the smartest people in them”). 
8 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 965. 
9 Id. at 984-86. 
10 Emile Servan-Schreiber et al., Prediction Markets:  Does Money Matter?, 14 ELEC-
TRONIC MARKETS 243, 243 (2004). 
11 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1023. 
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whether they think the event is likely or unlikely to occur.  The price 
at any point in time represents the players’ “collective consensus” on 
the likelihood of the outcome.12
Cass Sunstein argues that information markets can correct for the 
problems inherent in deliberative groups by 
impos[ing] the right incentives for people to disclose the information 
that they hold. . . . [I]n a deliberating group, members often have little 
incentive to say what they know.  By speaking out, they provide benefits 
to others, while possibly facing high private costs.  Information markets 
realign incentives in a way that is precisely designed to overcome these 
problems.  Because investments in such markets are generally not dis-
closed to the public, investors need not fear reputational sanctions if, for 
example, they have predicted that a company’s sales will be low or that a 
certain candidate will be elected president.
13
Because people must put their own money at risk in an information 
market, they tend to use the knowledge they have.14  “Insiders” act on 
closely held knowledge, which makes prices reflect reality to the 
greatest possible extent.15
Despite the conspicuous fate of the Policy Analysis Market, suc-
cessful counterexamples abound.  The Iowa Electronic Market (IEM) 
is perhaps the most famous information market.16  It allows traders to 
wager a limited amount of real money on a variety of future events.17  
In a consistent and well-publicized stream of successes, IEM traders 
predicted the results of four U.S. elections within a very small margin 
of error.18
12 See Servan-Schreiber et al., supra note 10, at 243 (“[T]he trading price reflects 
the traders’ collective consensus about the expected [outcome].”); Sunstein, supra 
note 1, at 1030 (“[T]he market price reflects the aggregate information held by par-
ticipants.”). 
13 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1024. 
14 Id. 
15 See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 4, at 265 (noting that in terrorism futures markets, 
terrorists or people close to terrorists might be enticed to reveal valuable information). 
16 IEM is hosted by professors at the University of Iowa’s Henry B. Tippie College 
of Business.  See Joyce E. Berg & Thomas A. Rietz, The Iowa Electronic Markets:  Stylized 
Facts and Open Issues, in INFORMATION MARKETS, supra note 3, at 142, 143-45  (describ-
ing the IEM). 
17 See id. at 143.  IEM’s most celebrated predictions have concerned election re-
sults, but other predictions include “political appointments, outcomes of legislative 
processes, international relationships, economic indicators, movie box office receipts, 
market capitalizations after an initial public offering (IPO), corporate earnings fore-
casts, corporate stock price returns, and the incidence of influenza.”  Id. 
18 See Levmore, supra note 3, at 591 (“The market-share security on the IEM has 
averaged an error rate of 1.37% over the last four elections, and this . . . error is well 
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Another popular market is the Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX), 
which is similar in most respects to the IEM except that its traders use 
“play money.”19  Participants trade “virtual” shares in actors and mov-
ies and attempt to predict box office revenues.20  The information the 
market produces is accurate enough that “HSX has started to sell data 
collected through the Exchange to the major studios which can profit 
from accurate predictions of film revenues.”21
Perhaps the most ambitious view is that markets can improve gov-
ernment decision making by aggregating views on what policies are 
likely or unlikely to work.  Economist Robin Hanson proposes, for ex-
ample, that we “vote on values, but bet on beliefs”—that is, we should 
rely on democracy to identify “what we want,” but “let speculative 
markets say how to get what we want.”22
In a 2002 article, Tom Bell explored the feasibility and legality of 
markets for “science claims”—theories that eventually would prove to 
be true or false.23  Bell identified the concern that such markets might 
run afoul of state and federal gambling laws, concluding that the legal 
analysis is “uncomfortably uncertain”24 due to a “dearth of controlling 
below that of the major polling organizations.”).  Betting on presidential elections is 
not a new phenomenon.  See Paul W. Rhode & Koleman S. Strumpf, Historical Predic-
tion Markets:  Wagering on Presidential Elections 2 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/BettingPaper_10Nov2003_ 
long2.pdf (“At times in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, betting on political out-
comes at the Curb Exchange in New York would exceed trading in stocks and 
bonds.”). 
19 Levmore, supra note 3, at 592. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 593.  There are many other anecdotes on the accuracy of information 
markets: 
Orange juice futures improved on National Weather Service forecasts, horse 
race markets beat horse race experts, Oscar markets beat columnist forecasts, 
gas-demand markets beat gas-demand experts, stock markets beat the official 
NASA panel at fingering the guilty company in the Challenger accident, elec-
tion markets beat national opinion polls, and corporate sales markets beat of-
ficial corporate forecasts. 
Robin Hanson, Foul Play in Information Markets, in INFORMATION MARKETS, supra note 3, 
at 126, 126 (citations omitted). 
22 Hanson, supra note 3, at 2.  Hanson offers a rule for policy formation:  “when 
speculative markets clearly estimate that a proposed policy would increase expected 
national welfare, that policy becomes law.”  Id. 
23 Tom W. Bell, Gambling for the Good, Trading for the Future:  The Legality of Markets 
in Science Claims, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 159, 159 & n.1 (2002). 
24 Id. at 167. 
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cases or clearly applicable statutes.”25  More recent analyses have also 
identified this problem and have cautioned that the apparent similar-
ity between information markets and gambling may prevent informa-
tion markets from thriving.26
This Comment shows why policymakers should view this legal un-
certainty with seriousness.  As experiments suggest, the advantages of 
information markets are not limited to tax revenue and amusement—
the perks that recommend activities that traditionally would be called 
gambling.  Information markets promise second-order benefits—
possibly even new product markets for predictions, as in the case of 
HSX.  An ambiguous legal status discourages experimentation in two 
dimensions:  first, prospective operators of information markets may 
be deterred by the threat of prosecution under state or federal gam-
bling statutes;27 and second, payment-system providers could refuse to 
provide liquidity to traders in nascent markets.28
In the years since the Internet has emerged as an economic force, 
law enforcement authorities29 and academics30 have begun to confront 
25 Id. at 180; see also Tom W. Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress of Sci-
ence and the Useful Arts, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 37, 65 (2006) (“A real-money prediction 
market in claims about science and technology should run little risk of violating the 
various prohibitions that U.S. law imposes on unlicensed gaming transactions.  Uncer-
tainty persists, however, due to the vagaries of anti-gambling laws and the still-untested 
question of their application to prediction markets.”).  Another recent article proposes 
that the Commodities Futures Trading Commission should regulate information mar-
kets.  See Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, A New Approach for Regulating Information 
Markets, 29 J. REG. ECON. 265, 268 (2006). 
26 See Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Introduction to Information Markets, in IN-
FORMATION MARKETS, supra note 3, at 1, 6 (identifying the concern that states may 
treat information markets as “a kind of Internet gambling”); Posting of Saul Levmore 
to University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, Gambling Laws, http:// 
uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/08/gambling_laws.html (Aug. 11, 2006, 12:06 
PM) (same). 
27 Bell, supra note 23, at 165-68; see, e.g., BetonSports, 3 Other Companies Are Indicted 
in U.S., WALL ST. J., Jul. 18, 2006, at D2 (reporting the indictment of a prominent 
online sports gambling company for racketeering, conspiracy, and fraud). 
28 See Michael Anastasio, The Enforceability of Internet Gambling Debts:  Laws, Policies, 
and Causes of Action, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, ¶¶ 8-12 (2001), http://www.vjolt.net/ 
vol6/issue1/v6i1a06-Anastasio.html (explaining that, because contracts for gambling 
debt are illegal in most states, there is an active dispute over the ability of credit card 
providers to accept charges from Internet gambling activities and to collect debts in-
curred from such gambling transactions); see also infra note 31 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006). 
29 See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNET GAMBLING:  AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE ISSUES (2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0389.pdf (presenting Con-
gress with research on some of the challenges of regulating online gambling). 
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the new problems of online gambling.  The information market strad-
dles a blurry line between legitimate commerce and illegal gambling.  
As online entertainment renews regulatory concerns about gambling, 
it is important to determine the place of information markets in U.S. 
gambling law.31  The specter of enforcement in an era of increased 
visibility of “problem gambling” may deter social experiments and 
chill the development of valuable new products. 
This Comment presses two claims.  The first, a descriptive claim 
about gambling law doctrine, is that some information markets are 
not clearly illegal games of chance, but the question is close enough 
to warrant concern.  The second, a normative claim, is that informa-
tion markets are distinguishable from most traditional gambling 
forms, and for that reason governments should consider allowing in-
formation market experiments to thrive without the threat of prosecu-
tion.  To that end, I propose a carve-out in state gambling laws for 
specified information market experiments.  History reveals a variety of 
exceptions to serve other ends, and I argue that information markets 
deserve similar treatment. 
30 See generally JOHN LYMAN MASON & MICHAEL NELSON, GOVERNING GAMBLING 81-
85 (2001) (discussing the proliferation of Internet gambling and congressional efforts 
to regulate it); I. NELSON ROSE & MARTIN D. OWENS JR., INTERNET GAMING LAW (2005) 
(examining the legality of online gambling).  One analysis that long preceded the pub-
lic embrace of the Internet unwittingly provided a point of contrast for Internet regu-
lation.  During the heyday of government regulation in the mid-twentieth century, 
games 
required a fixed location and schedule.  The bettor had to be able to come to 
a particular place at a particular time to place his or her bet.  This made the 
gambling organization vulnerable to police intervention at precisely that 
point.  The numbers collector could be easily identified by the flow of traffic 
at mid-morning. 
Peter Reuter, Police Regulation of Illegal Gambling:  Frustrations of Symbolic Enforcement, 474 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 36, 38 (1984). 
31 The most efficient information markets may require technology such as the 
Internet.  See Michael Abramowicz, Cyberadjudication, 86 IOWA L. REV. 533, 571-74 
(2001) (presenting the “technological, geographic, and theoretic” arguments for the 
increased efficiency of Internet markets).  Whether U.S. law reaches Internet gam-
bling transactions, particularly those that involve a foreign jurisdiction, is the subject of 
ongoing debate.  Bruce P. Keller, The Game’s the Same:  Why Gambling in Cyberspace Vio-
lates Federal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1570-73 (1999).  In October 2006, Congress en-
acted the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, which seeks to dis-
courage illegal online gambling by requiring financial institutions to ensure they do 
not provide payment systems for such activities.  Pub. L. No. 109-347, tit. 8, 120 Stat. 
1884.  This Comment assumes that information markets are within the reach of federal 
and state law, and thus does not address the question of whether information markets 
on the Internet might receive different legal treatment than non-Internet markets. 
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Part I provides a brief history of chance games and the vexing 
problems of prohibiting and regulating them.  It reviews policy ra-
tionales for government involvement in gaming and outlines the asso-
ciated problems of clarity, consistency, and enforcement.  Part II con-
siders whether or not information markets are clearly illegal under 
current state and federal gambling laws.  Part III presents a rationale 
for encouraging experimentation in information markets and pro-
poses an exception in the gambling laws to accommodate such ex-
perimentation. 
I.  GAMES OF CHANCE 
Deciding whether information markets are properly classified as 
games of chance, and determining whether the law should treat them 
that way, requires a brief excursion into the nature of chance games 
and the history of the uneasy relationship between gambling and the 
state. 
A.  Historical Overview 
Playing the odds is among the oldest human rituals.  Archaeologi-
cal discoveries,32 literary works,33 and early laws34 reveal chance games-
32 See REUVEN BRENNER WITH GABRIELLE A. BRENNER, GAMBLING AND SPECULA-
TION:  A THEORY, A HISTORY, AND A FUTURE OF SOME HUMAN DECISIONS 8 (1990) (de-
scribing the popularity of lotteries and games of chance in ancient Greece and Rome); 
Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs:  A Historical Examination of State-
Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 15 (1992) (“Various games of chance existed 
among ancient Egyptians, Chinese, Japanese, Hebrews, Greeks, Romans and the early 
Germanic Tribes.”). 
33 See Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling:  Public Policy and the 
Law, 64 MISS. L.J. 291, 297 n.36 (1995) (quoting several of William Shakespeare’s early 
seventeenth century plays that refer to a “lottery”).  A method of selection that suggests 
a modern dice game or drawing of straws appears in ancient scripture.  See, e.g., Leviti-
cus 16:8 (“And Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats; one lot for the LORD, and the 
other lot for [the scapegoat].”); Jonah 1:7 (“And they said every one to his fellow, 
‘Come, and let us cast lots, that we may know for whose cause this evil is upon us.’  So 
they cast lots and the lot fell upon Jonah.”); see also BRENNER WITH BRENNER, supra 
note 32, at 2-7 (describing the use of “lots” in ritual as well as in social and political de-
cisions).  Brenner cautions that, unlike some modern chance games, the ancient prac-
tices “were related to making decisions, to making up one’s mind in legal and religious 
matters, and had nothing to do with games of chance” because people believed the 
result was determined by divine power.  Id. at 5. 
34 The best-known attempt in England to curb gambling is the Statute of Anne, 
enacted in 1710.  See Gaming Act, 1710, 9 Ann., c. 14 (Eng.) (voiding some gambling 
debts and allowing losers to sue winners to recover lost money); see also I. NELSON 
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–sometimes with prizes—that span swaths of space and time.  Since 
gambling (defined broadly as “making a bet”35) is widely regarded to-
day as a vice,36 one might guess that it was stigmatized throughout 
modern history.  It was not.  Chance games—legal and otherwise—
were commonplace in American colonial culture, and they sometimes 
served important social and economic ends.37  People embraced lot-
teries because of their large revenue potential and their usefulness in 
bolstering civic and cultural institutions.38  Importantly, government 
leaders realized that “raffles offered a more painless method of raising 
cash than did the imposition of a new tax.”39
ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAW 73 (1986) (describing the Statute of Anne and its pur-
poses and effects in regard to gambling). 
35 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 679 (6th ed. 1990). 
36 See Keller, supra note 31, at 1569 (“For more than a century, Americans have 
believed that the social ills fostered by gambling outweigh its recreational value.”).  In 
the 1970s, sociologist David Oldman immersed himself in the gambler’s world by work-
ing part-time as a casino dealer.  Oldman found “a polarization of attitude between 
those who gamble regularly and those who do not.  The former are either incompre-
hensible to the latter, or else typified in terms of defect or deviance.”  David Oldman, 
Chance and Skill:  A Study of Roulette, 8 SOC. 407, 407 (1974).  London’s Royal Commis-
sion on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming was counseled by its Church Committee that 
gambling “divorces wealth from worth and is of such a nature that if it becomes a gov-
erning principle of business and finance it would mean utter chaos.”  Id. at 408. 
37 See generally JOHN SAMUEL EZELL, FORTUNE’S MERRY WHEEL:  THE LOTTERY IN 
AMERICA 29-59 (1960) (discussing the historical background of the lottery in colonial 
America); Rychlak, supra note 33, at 299-300 (describing the use of lotteries to raise 
money for the Jamestown settlement in Virginia, to improve infrastructure in colonial 
America, and to found several now-prominent colleges and universities).  Lotteries 
were particularly important to early social and economic development in Pennsylvania.  
See EDMUND S. MORGAN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 67-68 (2002) (describing a wildly popular 
lottery plan awarding “prizes,” through which Benjamin Franklin raised funds to buy 
armaments and build facilities for the Pennsylvania militia).  Importantly, the lottery in 
early America was, for private and public fundraisers, “a substitute for what are now 
customary sources of public and private finance,” such as banks and securities markets.  
BRENNER WITH BRENNER, supra note 32, at 13. 
38 See John Ezell, The Lottery in Colonial America, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 185, 194-95 
(1948) (discussing the factors motivating colonial governments to adopt lotteries).  
With the exception of the Quakers, who were morally opposed to gambling, id. at 188, 
early Americans generally 
felt that as long as there was protection against fraud, it was their own affair if 
they risked their money.  This feeling was particularly strong when the under-
taking was linked with an enterprise for public good.  Loyal citizens were even 
willing to circumvent the law by holding a drawing outside the colony if need 
be, when a church or school was to benefit. 
Id. at 194. 
39 Id.  See also ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES:  LEARN-
ING FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES, AND PLACES 132 (2001) (“By 1831 eight states spon-
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Legal gambling in America waned in the early twentieth century.40  
But states again embraced lotteries beginning in the 1960s because of 
the potential for state-run games to raise revenue and ease the tax 
burden on residents.41  Over time, moral objections to gambling in-
creasingly yielded to apparent economic interests.  Lawrence Fried-
man argues that the historical growth in popularity of “vices” such as 
gambling is emblematic of the early twentieth century cultural change 
that followed the repeal of Prohibition.42  He further argues that 
states, seeing the revenue potential, rushed to exploit the movement 
in mores.43
At the end of the twentieth century, gambling was widespread; 
about seventy percent of Americans in 1998 admitted to gambling 
during the previous year.44  By 2001, thirty-eight states and the District 
of Columbia had government-run lotteries,45 and those programs ap-
peared to have broad public support.46  Sports betting, a very different 
sored 420 lotteries yielding $66 million, over five times the budget of the federal gov-
ernment.”). 
40 See Rychlak, supra note 33, at 303 (discussing the relative lack of legalized and 
state-sponsored gambling from the turn of the century until the mid-1960s).  For a dis-
cussion of the development of gambling regulation over time, see infra Part I.C. 
41 See Rychlak, supra note 33, at 303 (discussing several examples of the reintro-
duction of the state-run lottery); see also NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, RE-
PORT 2-1 (1999), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html [hereinaf-
ter COMMISSION REPORT] (finding that “in 1997 lotteries existed in 37 states and the 
District of Columbia and garnered $34 billion in sales”).  Historians posit that govern-
ments sometimes respond to underground numbers games by establishing legal lotter-
ies in order to capture tax revenue.  See, e.g., BRENNER WITH BRENNER, supra note 32, at 
9-10 (recounting the reinstatement of the state-sponsored lottery in post-Revolution 
France when the government realized it was forgoing a revenue source). 
42 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 228-29 (2002). 
43 See id. (“Lottery laws turned state governments into high-class bookies.”). 
44 MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 39, at 129 (“About 68 percent of the adult 
population in 1998 reported having participated in some form of recreational gam-
bling in the past year; in that same year, about 64 percent consumed alcohol.” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
45 See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 10 (listing state lotteries and their dates 
of establishment). 
46 See id. at 13 (“Public support for lotteries in national Gallup polls rose from 61 
percent in 1975 to 72 percent in 1982, and has remained above 70 percent ever 
since.”).  However, a recent survey suggests public support may be slipping as financial 
stakes increase.  See PEW RESEARCH CTR., GAMBLING:  AS THE TAKE RISES, SO DOES PUB-
LIC CONCERN 2 (2006), http://pewresearch.org/assets/social/pdf/Gambling.pdf 
(“The negative turn in attitudes toward gambling appears to be driven by concerns 
that people are gambling too much rather than by any revival of the once common 
view that gambling is immoral.”). 
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kind of game, is also wildly popular.47  Although legal sports bets can 
be placed through casinos in Nevada, it is estimated that up to ninety-
nine percent of all sports betting in America is illegal.48  It seems to be 
particularly attractive to young people.49
B.  The Government’s Interest 
If a chance game is such an economically potent (and, presuma-
bly, personally exhilarating) transaction, then why heavily regulate or 
prohibit it?  Over time, a number of different rationales have been 
posed, and the type and extent of regulations have varied. 
It is hard to see, at first glance, how a roulette wheel could create 
wealth.  Thus, a fundamental criticism of gambling is that it “involves 
simply sterile transfers of money or goods between individuals, creat-
ing no new money or goods.”50  This is too simple a critique, as it ig-
nores the subjective entertainment value to gamblers.51  Even if gam-
47 See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 87-88 (arguing that the popularity of 
sports betting is driven both by Americans’ desire to gamble generally and by wide-
spread access to information that is useful in sports betting). 
48 Id. at 85-86.  The authors note that the total annual amount of sports bets in the 
United States is likely between $85 billion and $400 billion, hardly any of which is re-
ported to the Internal Revenue Service.  Id.  The reluctance to legalize sports betting is 
grounded not in “puritanical attitudes,” but in “concerns about the threat it would 
pose to the integrity of games that are close to holy rites in contemporary American 
life.”  MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 39, at 139-40.  But legalization of other gam-
bling forms may have brightened the prospects for illegal sports bookmakers.  See id. at 
143 (“Gambling is legitimized and the stigma of betting with bookmakers rather than 
legal operations seems to be declining.”); id. at 136 (“The major forms of gambling are 
now readily available in legal forms, with the important exception of wagering on 
sports events. . . . Off-track betting is now spreading throughout the country, allowing 
bettors to wager on horse races nationally, exactly the service offered by the classic 
bookmaker depicted in the film The Sting.”).  In perhaps the most infamous corrup-
tion scandal in professional sports history, eight Chicago White Sox players conspired 
with gamblers to fix the 1919 World Series.  The “Black Sox” lost to the Cincinnati 
Reds in eight games.  See generally ELIOT ASINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT:  THE BLACK SOX AND 
THE 1919 WORLD SERIES (Henry Holt & Co. 1987) (1963). 
49 See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 88 (citing a 1999 Gallup poll in which 
“27 percent of teenagers reported that they had bet on a professional sporting event in 
the past year,” compared with only thirteen percent of the surveyed adults). 
50 PAUL ANTHONY SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 425 (1971).  
51 See Guy Calvert, Gambling America:  Balancing the Risks of Gambling and Its Regula-
tion, POLICY ANALYSIS (CATO Inst., Washington, D.C.), June 18, 1999, at 7, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa349.pdf (discussing an additional, and often ig-
nored, utility value of gambling:  “the inherent enjoyment of the game”); see also Old-
man, supra note 36, at 424 (arguing that “the overall monetary loss that one makes 
when playing roulette” is properly seen as a payment for roulette’s entertainment value 
to the player—an “entrance fee”). 
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bling is not a zero-sum pursuit, however, it may carry negative exter-
nalities into the broader social realm.  Gambling “disorders,” for ex-
ample, are now commonly acknowledged in psychology52 and in 
popular culture.  In the mid-1990s, Congress created the National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission to “conduct a comprehensive 
study of the social and economic impacts of gambling in the United 
States.”53  The Commission released its lengthy report in 1999,54 con-
cluding that pathological gambling causes a “variety of financial, 
physical, and emotional problems, including divorce, domestic vio-
lence, child abuse and neglect, and a range of problems stemming 
from . . . severe financial hardship.”55  In a recent example of the ef-
fects of compulsive gambling, a college student was charged with rob-
bing a Pennsylvania bank, allegedly in order to feed his gambling ad-
diction.56  Judges have even allowed evidence of such disorders in 
criminal cases to support diminished capacity arguments for sentence 
reductions.57  The problem has become so widespread that some 
states now offer compulsive gamblers a state-sponsored self-help op-
tion.58  For example, Missouri has established a voluntary program by 
which a gambler may contract with a casino operator to permanently 
bar her from the casino’s premises.59  The law enlists the casinos to 
ensure that the gambler cannot bend on her promise not to gamble.60
Internet gambling is likely to present a particularly potent threat 
to younger people, who find the technology exciting and easily acces-
52 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 41, at 4-2 (listing the characteristics of 
“pathological gambling” as defined under the American Psychiatric Association Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual). 
53 National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 104-169, § 2, 110 
Stat. 1482 (1996). 
54 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 41. 
55 Id. at 4-13.  Other pronounced consequences for pathological gamblers in-
cluded unemployment and bankruptcy.  Id. 
56 Rachel Dissell, Student from Ohio Robbed Bank To Feed Gambling Habit, Lawyer Says, 
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 14, 2005, at A11. 
57 See generally Justin W. Starr, Comment, Diminished Capacity Departures for Compul-
sive Gambling:  Punishing the Pathological or Pardoning the Common Criminal?, 2003 BYU L. 
REV. 385 (discussing, and ultimately criticizing, downward departures in sentencing for 
compulsive gamblers). 
58 See Andy Rhea, Voluntary Self Exclusion Lists:  How They Work and Potential Problems, 
9 GAMING L. REV. 462, 463-64 (2005) (discussing programs through which individuals 
can voluntarily bar themselves from casinos). 
59 See id. (explaining Missouri’s program).  Similar programs exist in New Jersey, 
Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, and Michigan.  Id. at 463. 
60 Id. at 463-64. 
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sible.61  In addition to the effects on the gamblers themselves, another 
policy concern is that gambling will indirectly further other crime.  
For example, a casino—online or not—is an attractive front for 
money laundering.62
C.  Regulatory Approaches 
Efforts in the American colonies to restrict gambling were aimed 
at rooting out “idleness,” or the waste of time and money.63  This 
seems to have remained a minority view as legal lotteries flourished 
until the early 1800s.64  By that time, a majority of the states had estab-
lished drawings.65  But widespread corruption in the lottery business,66 
combined with renewed moralistic critiques of gambling,67 prompted 
a quick tightening of the noose around lotteries through the mid-
1800s,68 until almost every state had prohibited them69 and Congress 
had banned lottery materials from the mail and interstate com-
61 MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 83.  But see James F. Smith & Vicki Abt, 
Gambling as Play, 474 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 122, 131-32 (1984) (explain-
ing how games popular with children and adolescents tend to involve at least some 
skill, whereas many games popular with adults are purely chance based). 
62 See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 83 (explaining how money launderers 
could take advantage of unregulated Internet gaming sites). 
63 See Rychlak, supra note 33, at 298 (describing Puritans’ aversion to the “unpro-
ductive use of time”). 
64 See Rychlak, supra note 32, at 32 (“Until the early 1800s, there was little opposi-
tion to state-conducted lotteries.”). 
65 See id. at 31 (noting that due to the lack of a banking system or strong central 
government, lotteries were necessary to fund public works). 
66 See MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 39, at 132-33 (recounting corruption scan-
dals of the late nineteenth century). 
67 A Supreme Court opinion from this era colorfully states the public morals cri-
tique and draws an interesting distinction between lotteries and what apparently were 
seen as less harmful games: 
The suppression of nuisances injurious to public health or morality is among 
the most important duties of government.  Experience has shown that the 
common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in con-
trast with the wide-spread pestilence of lotteries.  The former are confined to 
a few persons and places, but the latter infests the whole community:  it enters 
every dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earnings of the 
poor; it plunders the ignorant and simple. 
Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. 163, 168 (1850). 
68 See Rychlak, supra note 32, at 32-38 (explaining how social problems associated 
with state-sponsored gambling and growing concern about fraudulent lotteries re-
sulted in more state control of lotteries). 
69 Id. at 44. 
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merce.70  The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed, and famously refused to 
disturb, Congress’s lottery prohibitions in Champion v. Ames.71
The federal government’s twentieth century attempts to curb 
prize gaming initially were aimed at fighting an organized crime prob-
lem that was viewed as both a cause and an effect of illegal gambling.  
The Senate’s influential “Kefauver Committee,” or the Special Com-
mittee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, re-
sponded to the apparent ineffectiveness of state gambling enforce-
ment and the easy transport of gambling devices in interstate 
commerce.72  The Committee’s investigation culminated in the pas-
sage of the Johnson Act.73  Its investigation also informed Attorney 
General Robert F. Kennedy’s later campaign against organized crime74 
and the resulting legislative efforts, which included the Interstate Wire 
Act,75 the Travel Act,76 and a law restricting the “transportation of wa-
70 See Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, 28 Stat. 963 (prohibiting the movement of lot-
tery tickets through interstate and foreign commerce). 
71 (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).  The Court held that the constitutional 
power to regulate interstate commerce included the power to prohibit items from en-
tering such commerce in the first place: 
If a State, when considering legislation for the suppression of lotteries within 
its own limits, may properly take into view the evils that inhere in the raising 
of money, in that mode, why may not Congress, invested with the power to 
regulate commerce among the several States, provide that such commerce 
shall not be polluted by the carrying of lottery tickets from one State to an-
other? 
Id. at 356.  The Court also recalled with approval its earlier admonition that “no state 
may bargain away its power to protect the public morals.”  Id. (citing Douglas v. Ken-
tucky, 168 U.S. 488, 497 (1897)). 
72 See G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland, The Development of the Federal Law of 
Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 923, 960-62 (1978) (explaining the Kefauver Commit-
tee’s mandate and its role in policy formation). 
73 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (2000) (banning the transport of certain gaming devices 
across state lines). 
74 See Blakey & Kurland, supra note 72, at 964-77 (reviewing Kennedy’s fight 
against organized crime and the related legislation). 
75 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000).  The relevant section provides: 
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses 
a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign 
commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or 
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire 
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a re-
sult of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wa-
gers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both. 
Id. § 1084(a). 
76 Id.  § 1952 (prohibiting travel across state lines with “intent” to engage in illegal 
business transactions). 
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gering paraphernalia.”77  In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized 
Crime Control Act, which further restricted gambling activities.78  In 
response to the technological boom, Congress has considered ways to 
curb Internet gambling.  One failed attempt was the Internet Gam-
bling Prohibition Act,79 introduced by Senator John Kyl of Arizona in 
1997.80  Very recently, Congress enacted the Unlawful Internet Gam-
bling Enforcement Act of 2006, which seeks to prevent credit provid-
ers from participating in illegal online gambling operations.81
A diffuse array of state and federal laws regulate games of chance 
today.82  State laws dominate in the majority of cases, because most of 
the relevant federal statutes define offenses by reference to state law.83  
Recent developments, however, suggest that an increase in the federal 
role might be inevitable.84
1.  Policy and Enforcement Concerns 
While concern for “public health or morality” may be a plausible 
justification for the restriction of any activity,85 a careful analysis ex-
poses a degree of inconsistency in policy and enforcement in the 
77 Id. § 1953. 
78 Id. § 1955 (prohibiting gambling businesses that meet certain requirements). 
79 S. 474, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing that the placing of bets over the Internet 
be made illegal); H.R. 2380, 105th Cong. (1997) (same). 
80 See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 84 (discussing the proposed Internet 
Gambling Prohibition Act and observing that it passed overwhelmingly in the Senate 
three times). 
81 See supra note 31 (discussing the Act). 
82 For a history of federal regulation of prize games, see generally Blakey & Kur-
land, supra note 72; James H. Frey, Federal Involvement in U.S. Gaming Regulation, 556 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 138 (1998). 
83 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1) (2000) (defining an “illegal gambling business” 
as one which violates the law of the state in which it is conducted); Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act, id. § 1961(6) (2000) (incorporating state law 
into the definition of an “unlawful debt” incurred in gambling activity); see also Bell, 
supra note 23, at 165 n.26 (discussing the dependence of federal statutes on state law 
for definitions). 
84 See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 80 (arguing that the rise of the Internet 
and the popularity of interstate sports betting point toward a federal solution); see also 
id. at 81 (observing that the National Association of Attorneys General asked the fed-
eral government to assume a more active role in regulating Internet gambling, since 
enforcement by states is difficult). 
85 Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. 163, 168 (1850).  But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 577 (2003) (“‘[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally 
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice . . . .’” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
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gambling area.  For example, the lottery, which is the most popular 
form of gambling and the one provided by the largest number of 
states, is questionable as a policy matter.  As a revenue-raising scheme, 
it is regressive:  its burden falls disproportionately on the poor.86  It 
also places the state in the uncomfortable position of contradicting 
itself on financial literacy and education by discouraging saving and 
promoting reliance on luck.87  Some state lotteries offer “video lottery 
terminals,” which are “made with the intention of looking and sound-
ing like slot machines.”88  Permitting these machines while prohibiting 
private slot parlors, as some states do, makes it difficult to see a coher-
ent antigambling state policy.89
William Stuntz argues that inconsistent enforcement in the states 
has eroded the social norms that motivated the enactment of the laws 
in the first place.90  A comparatively blunt, but sensible, critique sim-
ply observes that most states are now themselves in the gambling busi-
ness.91  Only two states—Utah92 and Hawaii93—now prohibit prize 
86 MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 25; see also MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 
39, at 141-42 (describing the “regressive” nature of the lottery).  The authors concede 
that illegal numbers games, which state lotteries partially displaced, may have been 
even more regressive than legal state lotteries, and in the illegal games the revenues 
went to corrupt organizations rather than state coffers.  Id. at 142. 
87 MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 25; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., A Channeling 
Approach to Gambling (and Derivatives) Regulation 6 (Aug. 11, 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (“It is remarkably unseemly, to say the least, that the 
same states that have enacted or implemented welfare laws which limit benefits to 
those who are willing to work also promote their lotteries as a way for winners to be-
come so wealthy that they ‘will never have to do another day of work.’”). 
88 MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 23, 28. 
89 See id. at 28 (“[B]ecause these [video lottery terminal] machines are made with 
the intention of looking and sounding like slot machines, states that have legalized 
VLTs but have not legalized casinos are entering a gray area between what their poli-
cies allow and what their lottery agencies practice.”); see also ROSE & OWENS, supra note 
30, at 6 (describing a Nevada law “making it a crime . . . for anyone anywhere in the 
world to take a bet on-line from anyone physically in Nevada” and vice-versa, but ex-
empting state-licensed operators in Nevada); Calvert, supra note 51, at 11 (arguing that 
by prohibiting private lotteries, states are able to extract unjustifiable monopoly rents).  
90 See William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1878 & n.18 
(2000) (observing that those who play “upscale games” escape prosecution while states 
shut down “numbers rackets,” the latter of which cater almost exclusively to the urban 
poor).  Stuntz theorizes that the “differential enforcement” of vice laws produces revo-
lutions in social norms that eventually swallow the laws.  Id. at 1878-80; see also MAC-
COUN & REUTER, supra note 39, at 129 (“[G]ambling in the context of commerce is 
frequently seen as constructive and wealth enhancing while recreational wagering, as 
for example in the state lottery, is merely redistributive.”). 
91 FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 229; see also MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 39, at 
138 (“[States] are directly stimulating demand to generate revenues from the high tax 
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gaming without exception.94  Many states allow casinos of various 
kinds95 and the dollars involved are substantial:  in financial terms, 
“legalized gambling is bigger than movies, bigger than spectator 
sports, bigger than theme parks, bigger than all the books, magazines, 
and newspapers published in the United States put together.”96
Enforcing gambling laws is fraught with difficulty.  Unlike in many 
other areas of the law, prohibition and regulation of gambling trans-
actions amount to curbing a market in which people conduct what 
they may believe to be mutually beneficial transactions.  There are 
practical problems to policing such “illegal” markets.  First, large 
numbers of people who usually comply with police requests disagree 
with the intervention in the market, making them less likely to comply 
in this context.  Second, participation in illegal markets only occa-
sionally produces a victim who will inform police.97  During the organ-
ized crime era, corruption posed another problem for enforcement.  
Due to the visibility of some gambling operations, proprietors “were 
strongly motivated to make payments to ensure that the police did not 
interrupt” the business.98  Another possible explanation for the failure 
of the 1960s assault on gambling is that many people simply ceased to 
feel strongly about its illegality and, therefore, it became difficult for 
officials to show concrete positive results.99
rate on lottery play.  However, the justification for that high tax is the belief that gam-
bling is an activity of questionable worth; these are hard to reconcile when the state 
creates new players.” (citation omitted)). 
92 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1102 (2003). 
93 HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1223 (1993). 
94 John M. Norwood, Gambling in the Twenty-First Century:  Judicial Resolution of Cur-
rent Issues, 74 MISS. L.J. 779, 779 n.2 (2005). 
95 See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 2 (“Eleven states, most of them in the 
nation’s heartland, now allow commercial casinos to operate.  Twenty-four states have 
casinos owned by American Indian tribes.”). 
96 Id. 
97 Reuter, supra note 30, at 37.  Reuter observes that “[g]ambling was the most im-
portant illegal market for the police during the period from the repeal of Prohibition 
in 1933 to about 1970,” when the enforcement of drug laws overtook gambling as the 
principal police concern.  Id. at 37 & n.1. 
98 Id. at 38. 
99 Id.; see also MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 39, at 136 (“[G]ambling enforce-
ment in the late twentieth century became a largely symbolic activity.  It generated 
headlines, mostly about corruption, but there was discernibly little faith that it accom-
plished much by way of crime control.  Moreover, the underlying assumption, that the 
activity itself needed to be criminalized, simply dissipated as a wealthier society sought 
more modes of exercising its freedom.”). 
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However, governments have not completely given up on enforcing 
the laws on the books.  In 1998, federal prosecutors shut down an off-
shore betting company operated by a U.S. citizen.100  In Texas in 2001, 
agents conducted a successful sting operation in a club that was offer-
ing chances to win retail gift certificates worth five dollars each.101  
Further, federal prosecutors recently brought charges against the ex-
ecutive of a high-profile Internet gambling business.102  Given the en-
forcement mechanisms in place, determining the status of informa-
tion markets under the current regulatory scheme is essential to these 
markets’ ongoing development. 
II.  ARE INFORMATION MARKETS GAMES OF CHANCE? 
This Part addresses whether information markets fall within the 
state and federal prohibitions on gambling.  The following discussion 
applies to the most common state law definition and federal liability 
under the Interstate Wire Act.103 
A.  State Law Liability 
The analysis begins with the three common law elements that con-
stitute a gambling violation in most states:  consideration, the possibil-
ity of a prize, and a dominant element of chance.104
1.  Consideration 
To give consideration in a game is to “risk something of value.”105  
There must be some chance of gain or loss to both parties to the wa-
100 See United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 70-71 (2d Cir. 2001) (charging “con-
spiracy and substantive offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084” as to an Internet and 
telephone sports book run out of Antigua by a U.S. citizen). 
101 Twenty-Nine Gambling Devices v. State, 110 S.W.3d 146, 148 (Tex. App. 2003).  
The Court of Appeals of Texas held that the gift certificates constituted “gambling 
proceeds” under Texas law, despite that law’s exemption for certain low-value “non-
cash merchandise.”  Id. at 151-52; see also Norwood, supra note 94, at 780 & n.10 (dis-
cussing Twenty-Nine Gambling Devices and legal exemptions for noncash prizes of rela-
tively little value). 
102 See supra note 27 (citing the indictment of the chief executive of BetonSports). 
103 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the Wire Act). 
104 ROSE & OWENS, supra note 30, at 11. 
105 Id. at 12; see also 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling §§ 2-3 (1999) (discussing the necessity 
that a party can lose as well as win in order for activity to constitute gambling). 
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ger.106  Most U.S. jurisdictions require that money be given as consid-
eration.107  Chance games in which players need not pay, but can win a 
prize, are legal sweepstakes because they lack consideration.108  For 
games conducted online, the burden of Internet access itself probably 
will not suffice as consideration.109
Most information markets require players to contribute something 
of value—indeed, advocates would say this is the reason for the mar-
kets’ predictive accuracy.  Thus, the element of consideration would 
be satisfied in most states in a typical information market.110
2.  Prize 
The second necessary element is that a prize be at stake.  A “free 
round” is not a prize in and of itself; in other words, the reward of 
more amusement does not suffice.111  When information markets 
trade with real cash, the prize element is certainly satisfied. 
Notably, the Hollywood Stock Exchange operates with “play 
money.”112  One author argues that “no market limited to mere play-
money can fully duplicate the incentives generated by a market using 
real money.”113  How, then, does HSX achieve predictive success?  
There is some new evidence that real money is not necessarily an es-
sential feature of an accurate information market.  Saul Levmore ob-
serves that, in the well-functioning HSX market, “players desire to win, 
presumably because winning can be as good a motivation as profit.”114  
106 See 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 17:6 (4th ed. 1997) (distinguishing wagers from competitions that simply of-
fer prizes). 
107 ROSE & OWENS, supra note 30, at 13.  A small number define consideration 
more broadly as a “right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some for-
bearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other.”  
Id. (quoting Op. Att’y Gen. N.Y. No. 96-F1 (Jan. 29, 1996), available at http:// 
www.oag.state.ny.us/lawyers/opinions/1996/formal/96_f1.html). 
108 Id. at 17. 
109 Id. at 18. 
110 Bell, supra note 23, at 166. 
111 See ROSE & OWENS, supra note 30, at 26 (“The overwhelming majority of juris-
dictions differentiate between a free replay and a credit which can be redeemed for 
cash or merchandise. . . . There are no cases on record of an Internet operator being 
accused of violating an anti-gambling law, when players can only win more game time 
or another round of the game.”). 
112 See Hollywood Stock Exchange, About HSX, http://www.hsx.com/about (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2007) (describing “virtual entertainment securities”). 
113 Bell, supra note 23, at 164. 
114 Levmore, supra note 3, at 594. 
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In fact, some HSX traders have been able to sell their play money on 
auction sites such as eBay for “hundreds of real dollars.”115  A 2004 
study provided strong evidence on the effectiveness of play money 
markets.  Researchers tracked sports predictions on two information 
markets that are similar in most respects, except that one uses real 
money and the other uses play money.116  They found that the predic-
tions in the play money market were not significantly less accurate 
than those in the real money market.117  The authors noted, however, 
that the predicted event—football game outcomes—is one that has a 
wide and relatively informed group of prospective traders in the U.S. 
market.118  When other, lesser-known or less understood events are to 
be predicted, real money may be the only way to motivate people to 
participate and become informed.119  Unfortunately, this suggests that 
the most useful information markets may also be the illegal ones. 
3.  Chance 
Generally, chance must “predominate” over skill in order for a 
game to be illegal as a form of gambling.120  Bowling,121 chess,122 check-
ers,123 and baseball124 are all examples of skill games.125  On the other 
115 Id. at 596.  Nonmonetary incentives are increasingly common online.  A number of 
Internet communities award nonmonetary “points” to users based on the quality of their 
contributions.  Users with a high number of points gain seniority and moderation privi-
leges.  See, e.g., Slashdot, FAQ—Comments and Moderation, http://www.slashdot.org/ 
faq/com-mod.shtml (last visited Jan. 21, 2007) (discussing “Karma,” a peer rating of 
user comments on a popular online technology forum). 
116 Servan-Schreiber et al., supra note 10, at 245. 
117 Id. at 250. 
118 Id. 
119 Cf. id. (suggesting that “knowledgeable traders can be motivated . . . by com-
munity bragging rights or by prizes awarded to the best forecasters”). 
120 See Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, The Games People Play:  Is It Time for a 
New Legal Approach to Prize Games?, 4 NEV. L.J. 197, 223 (2003) (explaining the Pre-
dominance Test, the prevailing test for identifying a game of chance). 
121 See State v. Wiley, 3 N.W.2d 620, 625 (Iowa 1942) (“Obviously, pin ball ma-
chines may not properly be compared to games of skill such as bowling or base ball 
[sic].”).
122 See People ex rel. Ellison v. Lavin, 71 N.E. 753, 755 (N.Y. 1904) (“Throwing dice 
is purely a game of chance, and chess is purely a game of skill.”).
123 See Johnson v. McDonald, 287 P. 220, 221 (Or. 1930) (“The predominant ele-
ment in [checkers] is one of skill.  The game would not appeal to any one who did not 
like to play checkers.  There is no apparent likelihood at all that the game, if played as 
designed, would cultivate a spirit of gambling.”).
124 See Wiley, 3 N.W.2d at 625. 
125 See generally 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 55 (1999) (discussing games of skill). 
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hand, poker games126 and contests whose outcomes depend on the 
weather127 have been called games of chance.128
Commentators have noticed that the doctrinal dichotomy of 
chance and skill is a problematic one, even when applied to relatively 
simple games.129  “[W]hat is, and what is not, a game of chance is not a 
simple matter of definition by fiat.”130  In playing a pure game of 
chance, a person is “entirely passive; he does not deploy his resources, 
skill, muscles or intelligence.  All he need do is await, in hope and 
trembling, the cast of the die.”131
When games begin to blur perceptions of chance and skill, consis-
tent classification can become problematic.  John Norwood recounts 
two recent cases in New York City involving the legal status of “shell 
games.”132  In a shell game, the player tries to keep track of an object 
placed under one of three shells as another person rapidly moves the 
shells.133  The cases Norwood cites focus on the closely analogous 
game of “three card monte,” in which the player must choose the 
“winning” card among three cards rapidly shifted by the dealer.134  In 
one case, the criminal court found that three card monte is a game of 
126 See State v. Schlein, 854 P.2d 296, 305 (Kan. 1993) (holding that a poker tour-
nament turns its location into a gambling place).  But see Smith & Abt, supra note 61, at 
129 (“Though the deal and draw are governed by chance, unless of course someone is 
cheating, the play of [poker] is ruled by skill and is a clear example of competitive 
play.”). 
127 See Classic Oldsmobile-Cadillac-GMC Truck, Inc. v. State, 704 A.2d 333, 335 
(Me. 1997) (holding that a game that depended on the weather was illegal gambling 
because there was an element of chance). 
128 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 4 (1999). 
It is the character of the game, and not the skill or want of skill of the player, 
which determines whether a game is one of chance or skill.  Thus, whether a 
game is one in which skill greatly predominates over chance is not to be 
measured by the standards of experts or any limited class of players, but by 
that of the average skill of a majority of players likely to play the game. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
129 See ROSE & OWENS, supra note 30, at 18-26 (describing the element of chance 
and how it factors into identifying illegal gambling activities); Cabot & Csoka, supra 
note 120, at 223-24 (noting that Internet skill games raise issues as they approach 
chance gambling). 
130 Oldman, supra note 36, at 407.  Oldman points out that even in pure chance 
games, one or more players may think they can recognize patterns or probabilities.  
These players may regard the game as one of skill even if it really is not.  Id. at 425. 
131 Id. at 408 (quoting ROGER CAILLOIS, MAN, PLAY, AND GAMES 17 (Meyer Barash 
trans., 1961)). 
132 Norwood, supra note 94, at 786-88. 
133 Id. at 786. 
134 Id. 
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skill, since “the accuracy of the eye of the player competes with the 
speed of the hand of the dealer.”135  Just a year later, another judge on 
the same court relied on another line of cases to find that three card 
monte is “essentially a game of chance, wherein the player has a one-
in-three chance of selecting the ‘right’ card if he can resist the opera-
tor’s manipulations and simply choose randomly.”136
The problem of defining skill and chance becomes clear when 
one looks to things that usually are not considered games.  For exam-
ple, the fact that gambling unites money and risk is not enough to dis-
tinguish it from transactions that are unquestionably legal and socially 
valuable.137  The conceptual link between gambling and speculation in 
financial instruments like derivatives, for example, is often noted.138
135 People v. Mohammed, 724 N.Y.S.2d 803, 806 (Crim. Ct. 2001); see also Nor-
wood, supra note 94, at 787 (discussing judicial determinations of “skill” and 
“chance”). 
136 People v. Denson, 745 N.Y.S.2d 852, 856 (Crim. Ct. 2002). 
137 See Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 
56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 279 (1948) (analogizing an individual’s choice among occupa-
tions, securities, or lines of business activity to the decision whether to gamble). 
138 See Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities:  Securi-
ties Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 375, 377 (2005) (“One thing that investing, hedging, insurance, and gambling 
have in common is that they all involve risk-taking, while only the first three activities 
are generally seen as involving risk-shifting or other legitimate economic benefits.”); 
Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets:  Online Securities Trading, 
Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371, 373-74 (2006) 
(“Regulators characterize investing as an enterprise of skill in which the assiduous and 
diligent may earn deserved rewards.  Conversely, gambling is viewed as an enterprise of 
chance that encourages the lazy and untalented to divert useful capital into a chaotic 
system whereby an undeserving few reap ill-gotten gains while the vast majority fool-
ishly lose.” (footnote omitted)); David A. Skeel, Jr., When Markets and Gambling Con-
verge, in THEOLOGY AND THE LIBERAL STATE (forthcoming 2007) (on file with author) 
(describing speculation as gambling’s “first cousin”); Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates 
Speculators:  Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 
701, 715 (1999) (“Common law courts regarded speculation as a type of wagering 
rather than a useful form of economic commerce.”); Skeel, supra note 87, at 22 n.40 
(noting that certain instruments like futures and derivatives “are designed to minimize 
risk, rather than to increase it” as gambling does).  Hanson argues that 
[t]he history of financial regulation can . . . be roughly summarized as every-
thing being banned as gambling (or usury) until an exception was granted for 
some newly legitimized higher purpose.  For each purpose, such as capitaliz-
ing firms, insuring idiosyncratic risk, or insuring common risk, laws and regu-
lations were created to ensure that generic gambling could not slip in.  We 
may thus reasonably hope to someday legitimate, and thereby legalize, mar-
kets whose main function is to aggregate information on questions that mat-
ter. 
Hanson, supra note 3, at 9 (citation omitted). 
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Because of the diversity of events that can be predicted with in-
formation markets, the third prong of the test—the predominant ele-
ment of chance—is the most difficult to apply.139  It is possible that an 
information market can be legal if it is “set up so that a strong argu-
ment can be made it is genuinely skill-based.”140  As Bell observes, 
whether a plausible argument can be made that the market does not 
run predominantly on chance depends on the nature of the uncertain 
event.141  Bell is concerned primarily with science claims, and to the 
extent that a good deal of scientific knowledge is required even to 
participate meaningfully in the market, it seems there is a good argu-
ment that chance does not predominate.142
Perhaps some types of uncertain events in information markets 
are more conducive to skill-based “bets” than others.  Christine Hurt 
recently offered a taxonomy of speculative transactions, using the 
amount of chance involved to differentiate among seemingly similar 
pursuits.143  “L” games, such as slot machines, lotteries, and roulette, 
are “pure” chance games.  The player cannot control the outcome 
through the exercise of skill.144  On the other hand, in “W” games, like 
blackjack and poker, skilled players actually can influence outcomes, 
but chance remains a significant factor.145  Hurt analogizes these 
games to derivatives and “day trading.”146  In a separate category 
(called “Type B speculation”) are sports betting and trading in indi-
vidual stocks.  Hurt contends these activities are dominated by skill 
because of the information people typically deploy when trading or 
betting.147  Under the doctrinal analysis described above, “W” games 
may have a predominant element of chance, while “Type B specula-
tion” probably does not.  If information markets can fairly be charac-
terized as “Type B speculation,” they might escape classification as 
games of chance. 
139 See Bell, supra note 23, at 167 (discussing the difficulty of applying this test). 
140 Cabot & Csoka, supra note 120, at 226. 
141 Bell, supra note 23, at 167. 
142 Id; see also Bell, supra note 25, at 66 (“By design, such a market concerns only 
questions susceptible to resolution by dint of skill rather than chance.  A prediction 
market aims, after all, to promote progress in the sciences and useful arts—not merely 
to reward good luck.”). 
143 Hurt, supra note 138, at 378.  The distinguishing factor is “the extent to which 
the occurrence of a random event influences the return.”  Id. at 379. 
144 Id. at 379-80. 
145 Id. at 381-82. 
146 Id. at 382-85. 
147 Id. at 387-90. 
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On this continuum of speculative transactions, information mar-
kets would seem to fall somewhere between “W” games and “Type B 
speculation.”  Information markets look quite different from “L” 
games:  in “L” games, the uncertain event itself—for example, the spin 
of the roulette wheel—is not susceptible to anyone’s knowledge or 
skill.  The question, then, is whether information markets are more 
like “W” games (poker and blackjack or day trading and derivatives) 
or “Type B speculation” (sports betting or customary trading in the 
stock market).  As Bell notes, the point of the market is that people 
use information to make money148—if chance entirely explained out-
comes, the market would be worthless and would probably not 
achieve predictive success.  But the universe of useful information 
markets may be quite a bit larger than the one Bell contemplates, and 
there is conflicting information as to what exactly drives people to 
participate.  For example, attracting “uninformed traders” is a crucial 
factor in efficient information markets (those that generate accurate 
predictions).149  Uninformed traders are likely to be motivated by 
“[r]isk-love, or the ‘thrill of a gamble,’” rather than by superior skill or 
knowledge.150  This suggests that for many traders in efficient informa-
tion markets, chance may predominate over skill. 
B.  Federal Liability Under the Wire Act 
There is ongoing debate about the extent of the Interstate Wire 
Act’s prohibitions on betting on non-sports events such as casino-style 
games or political contests.  By its text, the statute extends to “placing 
of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest.”151  It is disputed, 
however, whether “contest” encompasses bets on all types of future 
uncertain events, or only those relating to sports.  The Fifth Circuit 
settled on the latter reading in dicta when it affirmed a Louisiana dis-
trict court’s holding that “the Wire Act does not prohibit non-sports 
Internet gambling.”152  Some officials at the Justice Department ap-
148 Bell, supra note 25, at 53-54. 
149 Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Five Open Questions about Prediction Markets, in 
INFORMATION MARKETS, supra note 3, at 13, 19. 
150 Id. 
151 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2000). 
152 In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). 
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pear to believe, by contrast, that the Wire Act reaches beyond sports 
betting.153
C.  Litigation Strategies 
The discussion above suggests that the law of gambling may tend 
to produce different fates for seemingly similar “games.”  If the gov-
ernment appears to be making and enforcing policy in an irrational 
way, one potential avenue for redress for a criminal defendant is an 
equal protection challenge.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit considered and rejected just such a challenge to Pennsyl-
vania’s gaming laws in 1997 in United States v. Williams.154  The defen-
dants in Williams were convicted of running a gambling business un-
der the Pennsylvania statute that prohibits “‘pool selling,’ 
‘bookmaking,’ and related activities.”155  On appeal, the defendants 
argued that because the statute under which they were convicted pro-
hibited some kinds of gambling, while different statutes in the same 
state allowed other kinds, the state had impermissibly infringed the 
defendants’ economic rights by dividing state-authorized gambling 
from gambling not authorized by the state.156  In his opinion for the 
unanimous panel, then-Judge Alito easily dispensed with the defen-
dants’ equal protection challenge, since the rights the defendants 
claimed were not entitled to strict scrutiny.157  In an interesting elabo-
ration, the opinion favorably recalled the Supreme Court’s view in an 
earlier case: 
Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, 
requiring different remedies.  Or so the legislature may think.  Or the 
reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the 
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.  The legislature 
may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting 
the others.
158
As the Williams case illustrates, the basic rationality and consis-
tency of a state’s gaming policy is unlikely to be subjected to a search-
153 Hurt, supra note 138, at 414 n.289 (comparing the views of government lawyers 
on the issue). 
154 124 F.3d 411, 423 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that such a law was rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest). 
155 Id. at 421 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5514 (West)). 
156 Id. at 421-22. 
157 Id. at 423. 
158 Id. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) 
(citations omitted)). 
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ing judicial examination.159  Prospective information market operators 
should not expect, therefore, to be able to fight a battle in the courts 
on this issue. 
Although it appears that arguments about lax enforcement and 
policy inconsistency are very difficult to win, defendants in gambling 
cases may, as a last resort, be able to avail themselves of the protection 
of the rule of lenity, by which courts strictly construe criminal statutes 
when the statutes do not clearly cover new factual situations.160  The 
Second Circuit addressed such a claim in United States v. Cohen in 
2001.161  Cohen had been convicted of running a novel sports-betting 
operation from Antigua, taking bets from U.S. citizens in violation of 
the Wire Act.162  On appeal, Cohen argued, in part, that he lacked the 
requisite mens rea because he did not knowingly violate the statute 
and, further, that the rule of lenity should bar his conviction because 
the Wire Act is too ambiguous to apply to his alleged offenses.163  
Cohen lost on both counts.  As to the first argument, the court held 
that liability under the Wire Act requires only intent to do the acts that 
form the elements of the offense, not intent to violate the statute.164  
The court also applied a stringent lenity standard:  Cohen failed to 
show a “grievous ambiguity”165 in the statute such that the court could 
“make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”166  This 
certainly is a difficult standard for defendants to meet.  The Supreme 
Court in recent years has been willing to recognize lenity challenges, 
159 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confronted a similar question in Common-
wealth v. Kratsas, 764 A.2d 20 (Pa. 2001).  The defendants were charged with dealing in 
gambling machines.  Id. at 22.  They argued in a pretrial due process challenge that 
the relevant prohibitions on gambling in the state statute should be ignored, because 
the conduct that formed the basis of the alleged violation had become de facto legal 
because of lax enforcement.  Id. at 26.  The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.  
Id. at 25.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, and it stressed that it lacked au-
thority to “nullify a legislative enactment on the basis that its objectives have been frus-
trated, or even thwarted pervasively, even by those who are charged with enforcement 
responsibility.”  Id. at 26.  The idea for which the court had such distaste is desuetude, 
“the obscure doctrine by which a legislative enactment is judicially abrogated following 
a long period of nonenforcement.”  Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209, 2209 
(2006). 
160 See Bell, supra note 23, at 168 n.40 (discussing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 
259, 266 (1997), which explained the rule of lenity). 
161 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001). 
162 Id. at 70-71. 
163 Id. at 76. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974)). 
166 Id. (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995)). 
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but only where, under the criminal statute, “the defendant does not 
even need to be aware of the factual circumstances that make her ac-
tions criminal to be convicted or if the defendant must be aware of the 
relevant facts but need not be aware of their legal significance.”167
As the above discussion suggests, there is a real danger that a par-
ticularly successful information market experiment could attract legal 
action.  This was most likely the worry that led the operators of the 
IEM to obtain a “no-action” letter from the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission (CFTC).168  But it is difficult to know whether the 
CFTC will be willing to grant additional similar exemptions for nas-
cent markets.169
III.  A LEGISLATIVE EXCEPTION 
The benefits of information markets are still emerging, as the lit-
erature is relatively new, but the experiments are promising.  The 
prospect that successful information markets can improve important 
public and private decisions recalls the early use of lotteries as gov-
ernment tools in the American colonies.170  Both phenomena promise 
amusement and the chance at a windfall, but only as means toward a 
larger socioeconomic end. 
On the cost side of the scale, we can try to distinguish information 
markets on the ground that they are less likely to carry some of the 
negative externalities that inhere in traditional chance games.  For 
example, as opposed to commercial casinos, which concentrate rapid, 
high-value financial transactions in confined physical spaces and may 
therefore aggravate street crime, information markets require little or 
no physical infrastructure.171  Of course, this hardly distinguishes in-
formation markets from online blackjack; in both cases, compulsive 
“play” remains a concern.  But the relatively small amount we know 
167 Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2435 (2006). 
168 See Iowa Electronic Markets, Frequently Asked Questions, http:// 
www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/faq.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2007) (addressing this issue un-
der the heading “Is the IEM regulated?”). 
169 See Hahn & Tetlock, supra note 26, at 6 (reporting that CFTC no-action letters 
are “no longer being given out” for information markets such as IEM). 
170 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (describing such lotteries). 
171 See Nicole Davidson, Comment, Internet Gambling:  Should Fantasy Sports Leagues 
Be Prohibited?, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 222 (2002) (“The private environment of the 
Internet would not increase the incidence of street crime and prostitution. . . . Fantasy 
sports contests tend not to involve great amounts of money and arguably would not 
have any effect on crime rates.”). 
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about traders in information markets seems to confirm the suspicion 
that such markets are unlikely to attract people for whom windfall 
profit is the ultimate object.  For example, as of 2002, most IEM trad-
ers were putting less than fifty dollars into the market.172  In fact, the 
IEM limits investments to $500 per player.173  Particularly where state 
lotteries and slot parlors offer instant gratification, trading in informa-
tion markets—where more than mere seconds or hours pass between 
consideration and prize—may appear less attractive as pure enter-
tainment.174  But it remains possible that if information markets grow 
beyond the experimental early adopters, many of whom have purely 
academic interests, the typical compulsive use problem could emerge.  
The HSX example suggests that information market operators may be 
able to use “virtual” carrots,175 but more obscure (albeit very useful) 
markets might require real financial incentives.176
An exception for information market experiments would not be a 
legislative anomaly.  For example, Alaska explicitly allows for wagers 
on some uncertain events that do not concern the outcomes of sports 
games.177  At the same time, other states explicitly prohibit some con-
ceptually similar bets.178  Since a majority of states allow certain forms 
172 Levmore, supra note 3, at 592 n.13. 
173 Id. at 593. 
174 See Rhode & Strumpf, supra note 18, at 19 (observing that the legalization in 
New York in 1939 of some betting on horse racing offered prospective gamblers “sev-
eral contests per day to wager on that promised immediate rewards rather than a sin-
gle political contest stretching over several months”). 
175 See Servan-Schreiber et al., supra note 10, at 250 (concluding that there was “no 
significant difference in predictive accuracy” whether the market involved real or fake 
money). 
176 See supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the need to attract unin-
formed traders for market efficiency). 
177 By statute, Alaska may authorize a municipality or charitable organization to 
allow, among other things, a game in which “a prize of money is awarded for the clos-
est guess of the total number of salmon harvested commercially statewide . . . during a 
certain period of time,” or one in which the goal is the “closest guess of the time of the 
arrival of the first king salmon of the year at a designated spot.”  ALASKA STAT.  
§§ 05.15.100(a), .690(27), .690(43) (2004 & Supp. 2005); see also ROSE & OWENS, supra 
note 30, at 44 (discussing nonsports bets such as wagers on the due dates of pregnant 
celebrities). 
178 For example, an Illinois statute includes within its definition of illegal gambling 
“[s]ell[ing] pools upon the result of any game or contest of skill or chance, political 
nomination, appointment or election.”  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/28-1(a)(6) (West 
1993).  Another subsection criminalizes the making of wagers on such events.  Id. at 
5/28-1(a)(2).  In Pennsylvania, it is a first degree misdemeanor to receive a bet on a 
“political nomination, appointment or election, or upon any contest of any nature.”  
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5514(3) (2002). 
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of gambling for charitable purposes, it is clear that states are willing to 
carve out exceptions that suit their policy goals.179
There are substantial practical problems with a legislative excep-
tion for information markets.  First, because information markets are 
relatively new and variable, there is no commonly accepted model.  
This will make it difficult to write statutory language so that it is easy 
for courts to determine what is and is not permitted.  Some have pro-
posed that states should establish “a review mechanism so that pro-
moters can submit prize game schemes for proper characterization 
under existing laws.”180  A similar process for information markets 
could help eliminate confusion over definitions. 
A second problem is a trait of federalism that is perhaps unavoid-
able.  Some efficient information markets would probably require the 
participation of people in multiple states.  This means that even if an 
“early adopter” state takes the initiative to create an exception for in-
formation markets, the market may run afoul of prohibitions in fed-
eral law or the statutes of other states.  Still, as IEM market experts 
have observed, far more experimentation is necessary to determine 
the optimal design of information markets.181  Legislative approval of 
such experimentation could clear a barrier and help reveal whether 
real-money information markets will produce benefits that outweigh 
their social costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Governments should encourage information market experiments 
by providing legal clarity.  Markets could improve public and private 
decision making and spawn entirely new product markets, but the cur-
rent ambiguous gambling doctrine may stifle market development.  As 
policymakers consider whether to raise revenue by licensing tradi-
tional gambling forms such as slot machine parlors, it would be 
worthwhile to include this new decision tool in the debate. 
 
179 See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 30 (stating that “[c]haritable bingo . . . 
is legal in every state but Arkansas, Hawaii, Tennessee, and Utah”). 
180 Cabot & Csoka, supra note 120, at 259. 
181 See Berg & Rietz, supra note 16, at 164 (describing the “many open questions 
about prediction markets and when they are likely to be most accurate”). 
